Total factor productivity and electric utilities regulation by Philip Israilevich
Working Paper  8509 
TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
AND  ELECTRIC  UTILITIES REGULATION 
by Phi  1 ip  Israi  levich 
Working papers of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland 
are preliminary materials,  circulated to stimulate 
discussion and  critical comment.  The  views  expressed 
herein are those of the author and  not necessarily 
those of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Cleveland or  of 
the Board of Governors  of the Federal  ReserveeSystem. 
The  author  would  like to  thank Amy  Durrell,  who 
provided valuable research assistance. 
December  1985 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyIntroduction 
Regulators base electricity prices or rates on the average operating cost 
of producing electricity and on a "fair"  rate of return on capital for a given 
year  ' . 
There are two shortcomings with this procedure.  First, it does not 
consider the dynamics of average total costs and its components.  Regulations 
may influence the incentives of  utilities to innovate and overcapitalize as 
well  as the demand for electricity which, in  turn, may influence utility 
operating costs. 
Second, regulators consider only tangible input factors (capital,  labor, 
fuel, material)  in the calculation of average costs.  Intangible input factors 
(workers'  discipline, managerial  skills, returns to scale, for example) are 
not considered in the regulatory price mechanism because they have no explicit 
and measurable prices and their effect on utility output and costs is 
difficult to measure. 
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profits may  be  substantial.  Moreover,  the inability to  bring intangible input 
factors into the rate-setting process  may  create the wrong  incentives for a 
utility to  operate in the most  socially efficient way. 
One  solution to these problems  is to  examine  the components  of total 
factor productivity  (TFP).  These  components  include  the individual  input 
productivities,  a returns  to scale  effect,  and  an  average  cost  (AC)  shift 
term.  The  individual input productivities are the tangible input 
contributions,  the returns to  scale term identifies one  of the intangible 
factors,  and  the AC  shift term includes  the other  intangible effects.  Using 
this decomposition,  regulators may  obtain a better idea about  the sources of 
AC  change. 
To  measure  TFP,  economists  traditionally utilize the long-run price of 
capital  services.  This paper  argues  that for the purpose of  regulation,  the 
shadow  rent on  capital,  which  is the short-run measure  of the value of capital 
services,  is  more  appropriate.  This is  not a new  concept -- regulators have 
used  the shadow  capital rent measure  for  decades,  but its  use  with the TFP 
calculations,  which have  traditionally employed  a long-run capital rent 
measure,  is new.  An  understanding of the difference between  the  two notions 
of  capital rent helps  to  distinguish a short-run shift in  average  costs from a 
long-run shift. 
In  the  second  part of this paper,  the regulatory process  is  briefly 
described and  the usefulness  of TFP  indicators to  regulators  is discussed. 
TFP  and  return-to-scale effects are estimated  for  seven major Ohio "utilities 
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1964-82  period.  The  data and  their sources  are described in  Appendix  111. 
The  theoretical  discussion of  the short run average  cost  (AC)  shift  'is 
presented in  the third section of this paper.  It is  argued  in the fourth 
section that during times  when  rate hearings are held frequently,  a utility's 
incentive for productivity increases may  decline. 
The  Regulatory Process 
A  utility's accounting profit, which  is the primary concern of the Public 
Utility  Commission  of  Ohio (PUCO),  is  calculated as: 
n=R-OC 
where  R is  operating revenue  and OC  is the operating cost .  Whenever  a rate 
change  is requested,  PUCO  calculates the utility's "fair"  return on  capital as: 
n,=B*r 
where r  is the "fair"  rate of  return and  B is the rate base  or the book  value 
of  net capital  . 
The  difference between  the accounting profit,  n,  and  the fair profit, 
n,,  is the basic reason for the rate change;  electricity rates are  set by 
the regulator to  equate n with n,  on  the date the hearing is held.  As 
time passes,  n may  deviate from n,  if input prices,  electricity demand, 
and other factors change,  but a rate change  to  re-equate n with n,  is 
not made  until the next rate hearing.  A  utility  requests  a price change 
hearing when  it  is  convinced that its profit,  IT  is smaller than n,.  If 
PUCO  establishes  that n  exceeds  a reasonable return on  capital,  say  sB,  then 
PUCO.calls for a rate decrease  hearing.  Such  hearing is  usually prompted  by 
consumer  advocates,  when  n 2  sB  is  observed.  This regulatory price 
adjustment  mechanism  can  be  described as 
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P  Po<Pl  5  P,*1.2  if  n <  n, (rate  increase hearing)' 
P,  <  Po  if  n  >  sB  (rate  decrease hearing). 
Due to the passive nature of the regulatory process, the last constraint is 
observed very rarely.  This issue is addressed later in the text.  The rate 
increase hearing is the most common one.  In this case, electricity price 
increases from Po  to PI. 
At first blush, this rate-setting scheme appears sensible.  It seems 
,reasonably efficient to allow utilities to pass along operating costs. 
However, there are potentially serious problems related to consumer 
reactions to rate increases and to the types of incentives given to 
utilities.  First, rate increases may lower the consumption of  electricity, 
which may reduce n below n,  and trigger a rate increase, which in turn 
may lower consumption and trigger another rate increase and so on.  That is, 
the proper response to  falling utility profits because of lower demand may 
not be to raise rates.  Second, utilities may be able to effect rate 
increases by overcapitalizing, which affects their rate base B.  Indeed, 
rate increases lower the risk of capital  investment below the risk level of 
nonregulated industries, clearly giving utilities the incentive to 
overcapitalize.  Finally, the ability to obtain rate increases because of 
operating cost increases originating from productivity declines suggests 
that utilities may not have the incentive to raise productivity. 
Thus, not all  AC increases should be treated equally.  Increases in AC 
due to input price increases and to environmental regulation, for example, 
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decisions and  increases  that may  lead to  a long-run decline in  utility 
revenues  should not be  passed on  to  consumers.  It should be  clear that it 
is  important to  be  able to  distinguish among  the causes  of  AC  change.  In 
the following two parts of the paper,  a set of  measures  that explains  the 
cost change  as  a weighted sum  of different economic  factors,  based  on  a TFP 
approach,  is provided. 
A Simple  Total  Factor Productivity Measure  for Ohio Electric Utilities 
We  begin the discussion by relating AC  to  operating revenue.  Operating 
revenue  includes  net income  and  operating costs: 
(1)  R  =  B*~K  +  LorL +  F*~E  +  M*~M,  where 
rK  is  the rate of  return on  capital,  computed  as  rK  =  w/B  with IT 
calculated as  a residual  between  OC,  and  R 
L,  E,  and  M  are the number  of  employees,  fuel (energy)  consumption  in 
physical  units,  and  material,  computed  as  M  =  (material 
expense)/r  , respefitively used  in the production of electricity. 
rL,  rE,  and  r~ are the average  prices or wage  rates for the 
corresponding inputs. 
When  r,  in (1)  is equal  to the fair rate of  return on  capital, 
revenue  is equal  to  cost and  n equals  w,  from  the regulator's point of 
view.  In  addition,  the price of electricity is equal  to  total average  cdst, 
a  condition we  will maintain in  this part of the paper.  Later,  this 
assumption  is relaxed by  taking into account  the deviation of rk  from  the 
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capital  . 
Changes  in average  costs  can  be  decomposed  into changes  in input factor 
costs  and  changes  in  TFP.  According to  Kendrick  (19731,  p.  32,  "The  TFP 
ratio indicates  the relationship between  real product in  a given year  to the 
real product that would have  been  produced  (real  factor cost) if the 
productive efficiency of the factors had  been  the same  in the given year  as 
in the base  year."  The  TFP  ratio is: A=Q/Qc,  where  Q  is  real output and 
Qc  is  real factor cost in the base  year.  Taking the  time derivative of 
the above  equation and  dividing it  by  A,  one  derives:  AO=QO-QC0  .  Where 
(*")  indicates proportional  rate of  change.  The  discrete form of  Qc
O  is 
measured  by  the Tornqui st approxi  mation: 
(2)  QcO=Cs,  i
O 
where  s, is the cost share  in the base  year  of the  i-th input and i is the 
amount  of the tangible  input factor  employed,  such  as  capital  (K),  labor 
(L),  energy  (E) and  material  (M).  Substituting (2)  into (I),  the TFP  rate 
of  change  is  measured  as  a residual  growth of output that cannot  be 
explained by  the growth of tangible inputs: 
(3)  A"  =  QO-Is,  i
O 
This TFP  measure  ignores  the impact of the  intangible input factors.  A 
better TFP  measure  can  be  derived by eliminating one  of these  intangible 
factors,  the returns-to-scale effect from A
Oin  (3),  leaving a new  residual 
denoted as  Do  as  the new  TFP  measure.  This decomposition of TFP  can  best be 
demonstrated with the use  of a cost function following Gollop and  Roberts 
(1981).  Let the cost function be: 
(4)  C =  G  (rL,  r~,  r~,  r~,  Q,  T) 
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maximizes  profit by  optimizing the choice of  input factors.  Differentiating 
(4)  in  respect to  time one  derives: 
where i =  K,  L,  E  and  M.  According to  Sheppard's  lemma  for  a cost 
minimizing firm  (aG/ari>= i,  where i is input factor.  Applying 
Sheppard
ls  lemma  to (5>, one  derives: 
1  dC= Cri  +I  dri +aGQ@-  aG  1  - - 
Cdt  '  c  ri  dt  aQcQdt  atc 
then: 
(6)  C0  =  C  sir
0 
i  +  Ec,QO  +  Do 
I 
where  Ec,  =  aG Q  is the elasticity of cost with respect  to  output,  and 
aQ c 
Do =  -aG  1  is the proportionate shift of the cost function over  time. 
at c 
Using the expression for total cost,  we  can  define the dynamic 




O,  then according  to (6): 
The  change  in  average  cost,  holding input factor prices fixed,  is  due  to 
two factors:  Do,  which  is a  dynami-c  source  of economic  growth and 
E-  1,  which  is a  static source of economic  g.rowth  or scale effect. 
If  Ec,  <  1,  then average  cost  will decline with the rise of  output.  If 
Ec,  >  1,  average  cost  will increase.  In the case  of constant returns to 
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Equation  (7)  can  be  directly related to  TFP,  derived from equation  (3). 
To  illustrate the relationship between  the change  in  cost and  the change 
in  the production function,  we  proceed as  follows.  Totally differentiating 
the cost accounting  identity with respect to  time,  one  derives: 
Then  the proportional  change  in  average  cost is: 
The  change  in  TFP  is  a difference between output growth and  a divisia index 
of input growth (see  equation  (3)),  therefore: 
(8) -A
0  =  AC
O  -Csir
O, 
substituting (7)  into (8)  and  changing  sign 
(9)  A"  =  (1 -  EcQ>QO  - Do 
Equation 9 shows  that the TFP  measure  in (2)  has  a returns-to-scale bias. 
The  sources  of  economic  growth of the seven major Ohio utilities are 
quantified in  the dual  (cost)  form."  An  estimate of  D can  be  made  by 
using an estimate of Ec,  calculated by Gollop and  Roberts  (1981).  They 
found  that Ec,  varied between 0.7  and  0.9  in their sample of electric 
utilities which  included four of  the seven  major Ohio utilities.  For  the 
following calculations,  we  use  a value of 0.8  for  EcQ.  We  first discuss 
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electricity price and  consumption  behavior over  the 1964-1982  interval  were 
observed.  Within each period,  the direction of prices (AC)  and  sales of 
electricity changes  were  the same  for each  utility  in  the sample.  These 
four subperiods are 1964-1968,  1969-1973,  1974-1979 and  1980-1982.  Price 
and  total sales  figures for all seven  utilities are plotted in  chart 1. 
In  the first  period,  1964-1968,  the average  price of  electricity was 
fa1  1  ing and  sales  were  rising.  In the second  and  third periods,  1969-1973 
and  1974-1979,  electricity consumption  increased but prices also increased. 
In  1969-1973  period,  the increase in  sales  was  greater than in  the previous 
period,  but in  1974-1979  period electricity consumption fell considerably. 
Finally,  in  the third period,  1980-1982,  electricity consumption  declined 
for the first  time  in  Ohio's history and  prices increased at the faster rate 
than  in  the previous periods. 
The  sources of this behavior  can  be  identified by decomposing  AC  into 
the contributions made  by price changes  of  tangible inputs,  by the 
returns-to-scale effect,  and  by  the shift of the cost curve over  time using 
(7).  This is shown  in  table 1.  In  the 1964-1968  period,  the scale effect 
and  Do  indicator of  TFP  were  the major contributors to the decline of AC. 
Without  these  effects,  the tangible input price changes  would have  raised AC 
by 1.5  percent,  instead of the observed  decline of  1.5  percent.  In  the 
1969-1973 period,  the continuing increase of  sales of electricity lowered AC 
by  1.2  percent from the returns-to-scale effect.  Do  also reversed  its 
effect from the previous period,  raising AC  by 1.2  percent.  In  the 
1974-1979 period,  the scale effect on  AC  was  less than a percentage point 
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consumption of electricity declined,  forcing utilities away  from the optimal 
scale of  production and  increasing AC  by .07  percent and  Do  increased its 
contribution to the AC  increase by  3.6  percent. 
' 
The  impact of  other intangible factors on AC  was  negative in  the first 
period (DO<O).  This  was  possibly due  to  improvements  in  earlier-installed 
technologies  and  to  the  introduction of  more  efficient generators..  In later 
periods,  fewer  new  generators  were  installed,  causing a slowdown  in  the 
decline of  AC.  In  the  1970s,  most  Ohio utilities were  building nuclear 
plants,  which possibly limited resources for the improvement  of utilized 
facil  ities.  This possibility, plus tighter regulations on air qua1 i  ty  may 
have  caused  either the decline of TFP  (DO>O) or  the  increase in  AC. 
Table  1  Sources  of  Change  of AC  for Ohio Utilities 
Average  Annual  Rates  for the Period 
1964-68  1969-73  1974-79  1980-82 
Change  in  average  cost  AC
O  -0.015  0.057  0.130  0.120 
AC  curve  shift  Do  -0.012  0.012  0.029  0.036 
Return to scale effect  (EcQ-l)QO  -0.018  -0.028  -0.007  0.007 
Input price effect 
of  capital  sK.r;  -0.002  -0.005  -0.000  0.004 
Input price effect 
of 1  a  bor  sL.r;  0.005  0.010  0.008  0.010 
Input price effect 
of  energy  sE.r:  0.000  0.034  0.076  0.041 
Input price effect 
of materi  a1  sM.rl  0.01 1  0.018  0.025  0.022 
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In this section Do  is decomposed  further into a capacity utilization 
effect and  a regulatory  lag effect.  The  regulatory lag arises because  rate 
requests are made  only after costs have  changed  enough  to  warrant a rate 
increase.  Thus,  regulatory lag,  through capital rents and  revenues,  affects 
both AC  and  TFP  estimates.  In  the previous  section,  TFP  was  calculated using 
the  long-run assumption  of cost and  revenue  equality.  This assumption holds 
if the utility  pays  the  long-run price,  pk, of capital.  It  can  be  measured 
using the Christensen-Jorgenson  (1969)  rental price index,  but because  the 
price of  capital  is set by  the regulator as  the fair rate of  return on 
capital , it  may  not be  equal  to the long-run price of  capital P
k.  Thus,  our 
estimates of AC  and  TFP  will be  incorrect if P
k  does  not equal  the fair rate 
of return.  Interestingly, it turns out that these  capital price discrepancies 
reflect economic  measures  of capacity utilization.  A  detailed explanation of 
this phenomenon,  provided by Berndt  and  Fuss(1982>,  is presented below. 
The  key notion in the Berndt-Fuss approach  is  the firm's  capacity level of 
output.  The  capacity level of  output Q*  is characterized by  the  tangential 
point of  the long-run average  cost  (LRAC)  curve and  the short-run average  cost 
(SRAC)  curve.  If  the output price is higher  than  the LRAC  at point Q*,  the 
firm  will  operate  in the region Q*<Q  in  order to  maximize profits.  In this 
case,  the company  overutilizes its quasi-fixed capital. If  the price of the 
output is  lower  than  the LRAC  at point Q*,  then  the  firm  will  operate at the 
level  Q<Q* in  order  to  minimize  losses.  This  will lead to the 
underutilization of quasi-fixed capital.  Capacity utilization,  according to 
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k  is the 
expected  shadow  rental price of  capital.  Thus  the problem of  measuring 
capacity utilization becomes  one  of  measuring  the shadow  price of  capital.  As 
Berndt  and  Fuss(1982,p.  28)  argue  "...the  value of services from stocks  of the 
quasi-fixed inputs should  be  altered rather  than  their quantity."  At  the 
output level Q*,  the  shadow  price of  capital  is equal  to  the long-run price of 
capital,  Z
k=P
k,  and  therefore,  q=l.  Nevertheless, if the  firm  increases 
its  output above  Q*,  additional  units of  capital would  increase SRAC,  meaning 
that the firm  overutilizes  its capital and  therefore is willing to  pay more 
for its  quasi-fixed capital  than the market  price,  Zk>Pk,  and  q>l. 
To  make  this theory operational,  operationalize this theory,  one  needs  a 
measure  for the capital rent,  Z
k.  Hul ten (1983)  argues  that the residual 
income  accounted  as  a difference between  revenue  and  variable cost per  unit of 
capital is an  estimate of Z
k,  which  is the payment  for a unit of capital  at 
time t. 
Zk't'  =  P(t> *Q(t> -  Cri(t>*i(t),  where i =  L,E,M  -. 
K( t) 
In the  short run,  the  firm  minimizes  restricted variable costs  conditional 
on  variable factors prices,  the amount  of quasi-fixed capital,  and  output: 
where i =  L,  E,  M,  and  Pk(t>  is a "long-run" rent per  unit of capital stock 
(the t  parameter  is  omitted in the following for convenience).  P
k,  as 
opposed  to  Z
k,  is the opportunity rent for the  a1 ternative use  of the 
capital  stock.  In the case  of nonconstant returns,  the equality P
k  =  Z
k 
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the SR  cost,  which  is  not necessarily the minimum  point of short-run costs 
(see  Morrison and  Berndt).  The  difference between  P
k  and  Z
k  helps  to 
formulate the relationship between  short-  and  long-run average  cost.  To 
represent this relationship,  we  follow the Hulten approach  with some 
modification. 
First, we  derive a shift in  the SRAC  curve.  For  that purpose,  we  need  to 
define the partial derivative of the restricted variable cost with respect to 
capital  : 
The  derivation of equation  (11)  is presented in Appendix I.  A  similar 
equation was  derived by  Hulten for only one  variable component.  In  a 
short-run equilibrium,  marginal  cost equals price:  (aS/aQ> =  P,  and 
logarithmically differentiating (lo),  we  find (the derivation is similar to 
that of (6) and  presented  in  Appendix  11): 
The  only term left undefined  in (12)  is aslat.  It  can  be  expressed as 
S 
a function of  the  TFP  change  A",  having all input factors fixed (1): 
-  - 
Denote  SRAC  as  a =  SIQ.  Then  a
O=S
O-Q
O.  To  derive the shift  of theaSRAC, 
we  assume  input prices are constant  in (12),  (this defines  shift of the real 
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where 
=  S-PQ, 
and  by  rearranging terms, 
(13)  oO=-A"  +  PQ-S  (QO-A"-KO)  .  - 
The  second  term in  equation  (13)  is  a capacity utilization  measure.  If the 
utility  operates at the capacity level,  revenue  equals  cost  (PQ=S>,  and  the 
shadow  price of capital  is  equal  to  long-run price of capital  (Pk=Zk). 
Therefore,  at capacity,  the SRAC  change  (0")  is defined solely by  the  shift 
of LRAC  (-A
0).  Otherwise,  the shift in the SRAC  (besides,  the LRAC  shift)  is 
defined by  the change  in  the output-to-capital ratio  excluding technological 
change  A",  adjusted by  the ratio  of  profit to cost. 
The  sense  of the second  term of equation  (13)  is illustrated on  Fig.  2, 
assuming  A
O=O.  Say  a utility with the SRAC  curve  (KO, Pk) produces  output 
Q,,  which indicates an  overutilization of  capital.  In  order to  increase 
profits,  the utility should  increase  its capital  stock,  which  would  shift the 
SRAC  curve  to the right. 
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In  this case,  KO>O, Q
O=O,  and  (PQ-S>>O imply that the rightward  shift of the 
SRAC  curve  will lower  average  costs  (oO<O  assuming  AO=O).  Since  P  and  Q are 
fixed,  the decline in  average  costs  will raise the profit-to-cost  ratio 
(PQ-S)/S.  This  is different from equation  (13)  where  this ratio is assumed 
fixed at point Z,.  Thus  equation  (13)  underestimates the average  cost 
decline in this case.  On  the other hand,  this ratio  measured  at  point Z1 
would overestimate the change  in  o."  Similarly,  in  the case  of  negative 
profits,  the decrease  in  capital  would  lower  average  costs and  a fixed 
profit-to-cost  ratio (at the beginning of  the period)  would overestimate  the 
cost decline. 
Besides  the  shift from So to S1, there is  a  shift in the LRAC,  which 
is  measured  by A",  (i.e.  the vertical  shift in  SRAC  as  opposed  to  the 
horizontal one  discussed above).  This  is illustrated on Fig.  3. 
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Costs  in  Fig.  3 have  increased from So to S,  due  to  the change  in 
capaci ty uti  1  ization and  capi  tal-output ratio.  But,  due  to  the advancement i  n 
technology  (AO>O), costs  have  declined from  S, to S2. 
The  second  term in  equation  (13)  varies over  the business  cycle for 
unregulated industries.  In  a period of  economic  expansion,  the competitive 
firm  overutilizes its capital because  of  an  increasing profit-to-cost ratio 
making  o0 positive (considering AO=O>.  In this case,  the profit-to-cost 
ratio increases  and  more  output  is produced per unit of  capital  (QO-KO).  In  a 
period of  economic  downturn,  output  wi  11  decline toward Q*  (QO<O> with a 
decreasing output-to-capital ratio (QO-KO)<O,  making o0 negative.  Finally, 
at the  trough,  Q  might be  below the optimal  level with negative profit and  AC 
will increase  (oO>O)  if output continues  to  decline.  When  economic  recovery 
returns,  output increases and  (QO-KO>>O  and  AC  will start to  decline. 
In  most  of the existing TFP  studies,  the capacity utilization effect is 
not considered  (i.e.  o is equated  to  TFP).  In  such  a case,  TFP  has  a 
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industries most  likely coincides with the business  cycle.  For  this reason, 
comparison  of  o0 across  unregulated  companies  might be  satisfactory. 
Nevertheless,  comparing  TFPs  (unadjusted  for capacity bias) of regulated and 
unregulated industries has  a serious problem (such  comparison  was  done,  for 
example,  by Gollop &  Jorgenson  [19801>.  The  deviation of  revenue  from cost in 
regulated industries is affected more  by  the frequency of  hearings  than  the 
business  cycle;  it  was  observed  in  Ohio that the distribution of hearings  does 
not follow the business  cycle;  similar observations were  made  on  the U.S. 
level  (see  Braeutigam and  Quirk l19841).  Thus  TFP  estimates  should be 
different before and  after rate hearings  even  when  the  true TFP  does  not 
change  because  Z
k  varies around rate hearings.  For  the same  reason,  TFP 
comparisons  across  utilities in  different states can  be  misleading because of 
the differences in the regulatory lags.  Therefore,  for the proper  TFP 
measure,  the regulatory lag should  be  taken into account. 
Besides measuring  the capacity utilization effect, equation  (13)  can  be 
used  to measure  the regulatory lag effect  on  TFP.  For  this purpose,  a shadow 
price of capital  Z
k  should be  compared  with the fai  r-return-on-capi  tal index 
defined by PUCO.  If the  shadow  price of capital  is not equal  to the fair 
return,  then  two parameters  would  be  changed  by  regulators:  the  shadow  price 
of capital and  revenues.  These  changes  can  be  described as  follows.  Let the 
fair return on  capital be  (Zk  +  Gk),  where  G
k  is simply the difference 
between  Z
k  and  the fair return.  Then,  according to equation  (1  ), the 
corresponding  revenue  is  (PQ +  GkK).  Substituting the new  price of  capital 
and  revenue figures into equation  (1  I), one  de;ives: 
(as/a~)=  pk -  (z~+G~)  and  P~K-Z,K-G~K=S-PQ-G~K. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyCorrespondingly,  under  the new  conditions: 
aslat =  PQ+G
kK  A"  and  the term  PQ  QO  in  equation  (12)  is substituted by 
S  S  S 
(PQ+GkK>QO. Therefore,  equation  (1  3)  can  be  rewri  tten as 
The  last term on  the right in the above  expression  is  a regulatory lag effect 
on  the change  in  TFP.  Note  that it  equals zero when  G
k  is equal  to  zero, 
that is,  when  the shadow  price of capital  is  equal  to  the fair return on 
capital.  Finally,  noting QO-KO-AO=C~iiO-(C~i>K",  where  i=L,E,M,  and 
rewriting A"  in its static and  dynamic  components  (see  equation  [91>, equation 
(14)  can  be  rewritten as
7: 
(15)  o0 =  (Ec,-1  )QO+DO  +  (CS, i  "-(Cs, )KO).PQ-S+GkK  , where  i=L,E,M. 
S 
Since all the parameters  in  equation  (15)  can  be  calculated,  Do  can  be 
computed  as  a residual.  In this study,  P
k  and  G
k  for utilities were  not 
estimated and  thus  the D values  derived from equation  (14)  (which  would be 
different from D  values  derived in  equation  (7))  are not available. 
How  Fair is the Fair Rate of  Return Regulation? 
In  the first  period,  1963-1969,  utilities rarely requested rate hearings 
(see  table 3), which  suggests  that their return on  capital was  greater or 
equal  to  the fair return (as  defined by  PUCO),  that is, Gk<O  The  AC  decl  ine 
during this period contributed to  utility  profits without  the need  for 
mandatory  electricity price increases  (see  table 1).  Thus,  during the first 
period,  utilities were  interested in  maximizing TFP  growth because it  was 
translated into profit. 
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regulator is an extremely passive agent.  Price changes should be triggered by 
a request from utilities or consumer advocates.  Utilities, however, have a 
much better knowledge of their present and expected profit than consumer 
advocates.  Consumer advocates are more concerned with price increases than 
with utility profits.  In the first period, electricity prices were declining, 
which would make consumer advocates hesitant to request an even lower price 
decreases.  Thus, utilities were in a position to gain extra profit given the 
passivity of the reguEtor-.  As a result, during the first period, an 
extremely long regulatory lag occurred.  In the second period, 1969-1973, AC 
increased slightly, which triggered a modest increase in the frequency of 
heari  ngs  . 
In the third and fourth periods, the situation was very different.  Fuel 
prices started to increase very quickly, due to the Arab oil  embargo
8, as 
we1  1  as to  other input Tactors, such as inflation.  These were shocks to 
utility operating costs.  For a given electricity price, such operating-cost 
increases drove utility profits below the fair return.  Utilities promptly 
.responded  to this shock by requesting electricity price increases that, in 
most cases, were granted.  The frequency of hearings increased sharply as 
utilities had trouble keeping up with the effects  of  these shocks.  Moreover, 
a decline in productivity  (DO>O> contributed to the rise in AC.  The 
productivity decline could have been due to a number of intangible factors, 
some of which are under a utility's control.  Therefore, the decline in TFP 
might have been due to a lack of  incentives provided by the regulatory process 
during the last two periods.  The hypothetical  argument for such a possibility 
is illustrated below. 
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input-price increase,  LRAC  moves  up  to  point PI.  Area  PoABPl  is  the 
loss per unit of  output.  In  this case,  utilities will be  granted a price 
increase of  (PI--Po).  Such  a price setting process  in  general  takes  a 
year,  following a utility's request.  Now,  consider that the utility could 
have  increased its  TFP  to  partly offset the impact of  the price hike,  so  that 
instead of increasing cost to the P,  level, it  would have  increased costs 
only to  the P2 level  (and  correspondingly request price Pr  instead of 
PI>.  If stable input prices are expected  in the next year,  the utility  may 
not be  willing to  increase its TFP.  Instead,  the utility  would raise the 
price to PI,  and  in  the next year, it  would  lower  the cost per unit of 
output by A".  If output remains  the same,  in the second  year  the utility 
would  regain the loss of the previous year,  which was  due  to  having A
O=O. 
Nevertheless,  if  output increases,  the gain in  the second  year  (from 
suppressing A
O=O  in  the first  year)  will exceed  the losses.  This  simplistic 
example  illustrates the lack of incentives for utilities to  increase their TFP 
under  these  conditions. 
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Best available copyTABLE  2:  FREQUENCY  OF  PUCO  RATE  HEARINGS 
YEAR:  %  OF  UTILITIES REQUESTED  RATE  INCREASE 
Source:  Rate cases  filed; material provided by  PUCO. 
FIGURE  4.  Two-Year Plan 
1 
I 
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Input prices and productivity changes are two major sets of factors 
affecting utility operating costs.  While input prices are little affected  by 
a utility, its productivity changes are mostly the result of its long- and 
short-term planning.  Yet PUCO grants equal  significance to both sets of 
factors in their process of electricity price determination.  As a result, the 
present regulation may not provide an adequate incentive for a utility to 
lower its cost by means of raising its TFP level. 
In this paper, three types of factors  determining shifts in the SRAC curve 
were considered.  Each of these factors  (technological  change--D, return to 
scale effect--EcQQ
O, and capacity utilization effect--equation C141)  is a 
result of different activities and should be weighted differently in the price 
determination process. 
It was indicated that, contrary to common practice, TFP measurement 
without consideration of the capacity utilization and regulatory lag effects, 
is inadequate for comparing regulated and unregulated sectors. 
The most controversial of these three factors is technological change (D) 
because the determinants of D are poorly understood.  Nevertheless, economists 
are making initial  strides in understanding this factor.  For example, Gollop 
and Roberts (1983)  developed a method to consider pollution control  bias in 
the determination of technological change.  Obviously, more work is needed in 
this direction to give regulators valuable tools for measuring different 
economic and managerial activities. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copy- 23 - 
FOOTNOTES 
1.  For  the discription of the "Fair" rate of  return,  the Hope case  is 
often cited in  the  literature: "Rates,  which  enables  the company  to  operate 
successfully,  to maintain its  financial  integrity, to attract capital,  and 
to  compensate  its investors  for the risk assumed  ...".  Fed.  Power  Comm'n  v. 
Hope  Natural  Gas  Co.,  320 U.S.  591  (1944): 
2.  20  percent  is an  upper  boundary for an  anual  price increase established 
by  PUCO. 
3.  For  details on  the Tornquist approximation,  see  Cowing,  et.  al.  (1981) 
4.  These  utilities are:  Ohio Power,  Cincinnati  Gas  and  Electric, 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating,  Columbus  and  Southern Ohio Electric,  Dayton 
Power  and  Light,  Ohio Edison,  and  Toledo Edison. 
5.  In  case of constant  returns to  scale,  this point is  always  at the 
mi  n i  mum  of SRAC. 
6.  This problem is similar to the question of  whether  to measure  shares 
for  Divisia index  at t or t+l  period.  The  Tornquist approximation  suggests 
an  average  share of two periods. 
7.  The  expression for Q0-K0-A"  can  be  derived as  follows A0=Q0-Cs,iO 
for i =  K,L,E,M  or -QO  +  Cs,i0- (1-s,)K0=-K0-A"  for i =  L,E,M,  then 
Q0-K0-A"  =  Cs,i
O -  (Cs,)KO for i =  L,E,M 
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Best available copy8.  Ohio utilities consume coal, which had a much less severe price 
increase than oi  1  fuel. 
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Appendix  I  The  Derivation of  Equation  (11) 
We  prove  that  =  P
k  -  Z
k 
aK 
From  equation  (lo), we  derive 
where  is the marginal  rate of technical  substi  tution (MRTS) .  In the SR, 
aK 
output  is a function of  quasi-fixed capital and  of variable inputs,  which 
depend  on  given capital: 
Q  =fCK,  L(K>,  E(K),  M(K)lff(X) 
Rates  of technical  substitution can  be  derived holding output fixed,  with 
corresponding inputs combination  X*: 
\  where i =  L,  E,  M.  For  the proof,  we  have  to  derive MRTS  for any  single 
variable.  Consider  labor  to  capital MRTS  then from  the above  equation  for i = 
In  the SR: 
af(X*> =  ZK and  af(X*)  =  ri.  Then  substituting (1.2)  into (1 .I>, 
aK  a i 
Q.E.D. 
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Based  on  the  short-run cost function (10)  we  derive equation  (12>, as  follows: 
ds =  as  d~ +  c %  dri - % +  as  d~  - 
dt  aK  dt  ar,  dt  at  a~  dt 
=  (Pk-Zk)K*KO +  C  i*r *rO - & +  PQ*QO then,  dividing 
at 
both sides by S 
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Revenue  (Electric operating revenue)  represents  total operating revenues  from 
the  sale of electricity. 
Output  (Electric  sales)  represents  the  total kilowatt hours of  electricity 
sold to  all residential,  commercial  and  industrial customers  including sales 
for resal  e. 
Fuel  Operation Expense  represents  the  total cost of fuel used  exclusively for 
production of electric energy. 
Average  Cost  of  fuel per million Btu,  represents  the  total cost of fuel 
consumed  for  electric generation divided by  its total Btu content. 
Material  Expense  was  derived from Electric Operating Expenses  minus  taxes, 
labor and  fuel expense. 
Material  Price Index.  Handy-Whitman  cost (index  of  Utility Plant Materials. 
Rate  Base  is computed  as  a sum  of Net Utility  Plant and  the Change  in Working 
Capital.  This  computation  is  consistent with a regulatory definition of the 
rate base. 
Return on capital  is  computed  as  a ratio between  Operating Income  and  the rate 
Base. 
Net  Utility Plant represents  the historical cost,  less accumulated 
depreciation of the total fixed utility plant and  equipment. 
Change  in  Working  Capital  represents  the amount  of cach or liquid assets  a 
company  must  have  to  meet  current costs  until.reimbursed  by  its customers. 
Operating Income  represents  total operation revenues  earned from electric 
services minus  total operating expenses. 
Number  of Employees  is  electric department  employees  where  each  part-time 
worker  is  counted as  one-half of a full-time employee. 
Labor  Expenses  is defined as  total salaries and  wages  charged  to electric 
operation and  maintenance  production. 
Wage  Rate  is  measured  as  labor expenses  divided by  the number  of  employees. 
Number  of employees  and  labor expenses  were  derived from "Financial  Statistics 
of Selected Electric Utilities."  The  rest of data were  derived from Cornpustat 
Co . 
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